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In this study we investigated the relationship between aesthetic experience and other 
emotional qualities judged in paintings. Aesthetic experience was defined as an exceptional
state of mind in which a person is focused on a particular object, transcending its everyday
uses and meanings and losing the awareness of surroundings and even of himself/herself. In
this state a person has an exceptional emotional experience, that is a feeling of unity with the
object. Our basic idea is that aesthetic experience is not reducible to pleasure or a positive
hedonic tone, but a person can equally be fascinated with both pleasant and unpleasant 
objects. In preliminary studies we specified the stimulus set of figural and semi-figural
paintings, and a set of descriptors of emotions, feelings and aesthetic experience. Participants
judged the paintings on descriptors (seven-point scales). Factor analysis revealed two large
factors: the bipolar factor Affective Tone (descriptors on the positive pole: lovely, charming,
cheerful, etc; descriptors on the negative pole: scary, disgusting, hateful etc.) and Aesthetic l
Experience (descriptors: exceptional, profound,  d d unique, etc.). Additional analyses have shown
no significant correlation between the two factors. These findings confirmed our idea that 
aesthetic experience is independent of pleasure or affective attraction, and that it can be
induced by both pleasant and unpleasant paintings.
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The concept of aesthetic experience has two general meanings in the
psychology of art. The first meaning is very close to the common sense definition
in which aesthetic experience is identifiable with aesthetic preference. According
to this, all objects, scenes and events in our surroundings can be experienced as
more or less aesthetic or judged as more or less beautiful, pleasant or attractive.
In this paper we will use the concept of aesthetic experience in its second 
meaning, that is as the exceptional state of mind induced by particular objects,
scenes and events.
Cupchik and W inston  (1996) s pecified aesthetic experience as a
psychological process in which the attention is focused on the object and 
all other objects, events and everyday concerns are suppressed. Similarly,AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND THE EMOTIONAL CONTENT OF PAINTINGS 48
Ognjenović (1997) defined aesthetic experience as a particular kind of subject-
object relationship in which only one object exists in the mind and strongly
engages the subject, shadowing all other objects and events in its surroundings.
According to this view, aesthetic situations and objects of aesthetic fascination
are fundamentally different from everyday situations and objects of everyday
use. One of the best examples of this difference is the famous Picasso’s Bull’s
Head: taken as themselves the bicycle handlebars and seat are everyday objects
which can be judged as more or less beautiful, elegant, and well designed and 
the like, but only their combination into a new whole, a bull’s head, induces the
real aesthetic experience. In other words, in the composition Bull’s Head, the
bicycle parts lose their everyday pragmatic meaning and transcend into the new
aesthetic (virtual) level of reality.
The concept of aesthetic experience  is similar to Czikszentmihalyi’s
notion of flow (Csíkszentmihályi, 1975, 1990). Flow is a mental state in which
the persons are fully immersed in what they are doing, with full involvement in
the process of the activity. Like an aesthetic experience, a flow is characterized 
by high concentrating and focusing, a loss of the feeling of self-consciousness,
distorted sense of time, and the like (Csíkszentmihályi, 1975; Csíkszentmihályi
& Rathunde, 1993).
Aestetic experience can also be associated with Tellegen and Atkinson’s
(1974) concept of absorption. Absorption is the disposition of having episodes of 
single ’total’ attention that fully engages the subject’s perceptual, representational
and motor recources. Typical situations in which absorption emerges are
watching movies or theatre shows, reading novels and poetry, listening to music
or observing paintings. In all these situations the person loses awareness of his/
her surrounding environment and becomes fully engaged in the virtual world,
experiencing himself/herself as a part of this virtual artistic space (e.g. virtual
world of movie) rather than sitting in the audience (about the duality between
reality and aesthetic ‛reality’ see Frijda, 1989).
The aesthetic experience can be categorized in Maslow’s peak experiences,
as well  (Maslow, 1968). In this category of experiences attention  is totally
engaged and focused on a certain object and t he object  is seen as detached 
from its possible usefulness and purpose. A person is ego-transcending, self-
forgetful and disoriented in time and space. This aspect of peak experience can
be recognized in so-called mindfulness and similar states of mental focusing in
meditation, as well (cf. Kabat-Zinn, 1998; Teasdale, 1999).
In his classic book Act of creation Arthur Koestler (1970) put aesthetic
experience in the context of creative processes emerging in art, science and even
humor and playing. Koestler’s basic idea is that the creative act happens if two or 
more apparently incompatible conceptual frames are associated in a completely
new entity, as for instance the bicycle handlebars and seat are brought together 
in the Bull’s  head. Koestler held that these frames are juxtaposed in the arts,Slobodan Marković 49
fused into a new larger synthesis in science and reversed in jokes and humor.
This corresponds to a “self-transcending” tendency in art and a “self-assertive”
tendency in humor, while in science both tendencies are balanced. All these states
are followed by exceptional feelings which Koestler called the Aha experience
in scientific discoveries (also known as Eureka experience), Ah experience in art 
appreciation and Ha-ha experience in humor (Koestler, 1970).
In our previous study we empirically  investigated t he phenomenon
of aesthetic experience and attempted to specify  its relationship with other 
dimensions of the subjective judgements of paintings (Polovina & Marković,
2006). Aesthetic experinece was defined by a set of descriptors selected from two
lists of attributes. One list was made by a group of participants who gave short 
descriptions (mostly adjectives) of their aesthetic experience, and the second 
list was made by a small group of experts (psychologists, philosophers and art 
historians) w ho analysed t he  descriptions of aesthetic experience  in samples
of relevant literature (art theoretic essays, philosophical aesthetics, art history,
psychology of art, and the like). The nine most frequent descriptors were selected:
fascinating, irresistible, unique, eternal, profound, exceptional, universal,
unspeakable, and I would like to have this painting. Twenty four representative
paintings, taken from the previous study (Radonjić & Marković, 2005; stimuli
also used in Marković & Radonjić, 2008), were judged on nine unipolar seven-
point scales that were made up of nine descriptors. The factor analysis extracted 
one principal component: the descriptors exceptional, fascinating and  g irresistible
were most loaded with the obtained factor.
Summarizing the up-mentioned theoretical descriptions of aesthetic
experience we will see that the following characteristics figure as crucial and 
distinctive. The first characteristic refers to the attentive and motivational aspect 
of aesthetic experience: a person is strongly focused on and fascinated with a
particular object or event, losing the awareness of the surrounding environment 
and even of himself/herself. The second characteristic expresses the semantic
and imaginative aspect of aesthetic experience: aesthetic objects and events
become parts of virtual reality, transcending their everyday uses and meanings
(e.g. we ‘see’ the bull’s head, not the combination of bicycle parts; in theatre we
are worried about the characters, not the actors). Finally, the third characteristic
of aesthetic experience is affective: a person has an exceptional emotional
experience, that is a strong and clear feeling of unity with the object.
Recent neuroimaging studies provide the neural evidences for 
phenomenologically specified c haracteristics of aesthetic experience, such
as its difference from everyday experience. For example, Cupchik and his
collaborators (Cupchik, Vartanian, Crawley, & Mikulis, 2009) found that distinct 
brain areas were activated when the observers were oriented to the aesthetic
or pragmatic aspects of the same paintings. The fMRI data have shown that 
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fusiform gyrus (the area associated with face perception and with the perception
of some other categories of objects, cf. Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby,
1996; McCarth, Gore, & Allison, 1997) whereas the aesthetic orientation was
associated with higher activation of the left and right insula (areas involved in
emotional experience, cf. Paradiso, Johnson, Anderson, O’Leary, Watkins, Ponto,
& Hichwa, 1999; Teasdale, Howard, Cox, Ha, Brammer, Williams, & Checkley,
1999; Lane, Reiman, Bradley, Lang, Ahern, Davidson, & Schwartz, 1997) and 
left lateral pre-frontal cortex (the area which plays a role in the cognitive control
and the higher-order self referential processes, cf. Burgess, & Gilbert, 2007). The
cingulate cortex can also be considered as a neural structure important for the
regulation of the attentional aspect of aesthetic experience (aesthetic fascination
as an increased attention) and the coordination of emotional and cognitive
processes involved in aesthetic experience (cf. Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).
Nadal and his collaborators proposed a tentative three-component model
which aim is to put the emotional and cognitive processes involved in aesthetic
experience into the same framework (Nadal, Munar, Capo, Rosselio, & Cela-
Conde, 2008). The first component is an emotional response. This component 
has two aspects, (a) representation of the reward value which is associated 
with pleasantness-unpleasantness of stimuli (orbitofrontal cortex and caudate
nucleus), and (b) attentional regulation which is associated with the awareness
of the emotional state (anterior cingulate cortex). The second component is the
enhancement of early visual processing (occipital, visual cortex), and finally,
the third component is decision-making (left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). A 
future evaluation of this model can give us better insight into the relationship
between the emotional and attentional aspects of aesthetic experience (e.g. the
relationship between a hedonic tone and fascination).
Aesthetic experience and hedonic tone
Philosophical aesthetics and art history created the various taxonomies of 
aesthetic categories in which some of them reflect positive emotions such as
beauty, sublime, charming, humor, whereas some are associated with negative
emotions such as tragic and even ugly and grotesque. One of the, perhaps, most 
comprehensive lists of aesthetic categories in western art was made by Umberto
Eco (2004). He analysed many aesthetic categories, where some of them are
hedonically incompatible: beauty of the harmony and beauty of the monstrous,
charming and sublime, erotic beauty and beauty of the machines, magic beauty
and restless beauty, and so forth. Recently, he devoted a whole book to the
ugliness and aesthetic appeal of deformation, monstrous, grotesque, morbid,
horrible and the other kinds of ugliness (Eco, 2007).
Some theoretical models in the psychology of art emphasize that the
aesthetic experience is dominantly associated with the positive affective
states, emotions and feelings, such as pleasure,  happiness, and t he  like  (cf.
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as crucial for inducing these positive states, such as prototypicality of the
paintings’ content (Martindale & Moore, 1990), ease of the artworks processing
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), and so on. Other authors attempted to specify
the specific aesthetic role of negative emotions such as hostile emotions (anger,
disgust and contempt), some self-consciousness emotions (shame, guilt, regret,
embarrassment) and some cognitive emotions (confusion) (Silvia, 2009; see also
Cooper & Silvia, 2009; Silvia & Brown, 2007).
Studies in the field of individual differences have shown that the preference
for pleasant or unpleasant artwork was correlated with some personality
dimensions. The preference for unpleasant paintings was associated with the high
scores of the Sensation Seeking scales (Furnham & Avison, 1997; Rawlings,
2003; Rawlings, Barrantes i Vidal, & Furnham, 2000; Tobacyck, Myers &
Bailey, 1981; Zaleski, 1984; Zuckerman, Ulrich, & McLaughlin, 1993). Some
findings suggest that the preference for unpleasant (violent) pictures is related 
to Openness to Experience and two Schizotipy scales, Unusual Experience and 
Impulsive Nonconformity (Rawlings, 2000, 2003). Generally speaking, these
results show that the aesthetic fascination can be focused on artwork with totally
opposite hedonic tones: high scorers of Sensation Seeking scales are fascinated 
with unpleasant, morbid and violent paintings, whereas low scorers are fascinated 
with pleasant, peaceful and erotic paintings.
Many neuroimaging and pathological studies were made in order to specify
the brain areas differentially sensitive to pleasant (beautiful) and unpleasant 
(ugly) visual artworks (paintings and photographs). The data have shown that 
the processing of pleasant pictures was associated with the medial orbitofrontal
cortex (Aharon, Etcoff, Ariely, Chabris, O’Conor, & Breiter, 2001; Kawabata
& Zeki, 2004; Paradiso et al., 1999; Rolls, 2000) and the dorsolateral sites of 
the prefrontal cortex (Cela-Conde, Marty, Maestu, Ortiz, Munar, Fernandez,
Roca, Rossello, & Quesney, 2004; Paradiso et al., 1999), whereas the ventral
sites of the right orbitofrontal cortex increased the responses more to aversive
than to pleasant stimuli  (Kawasaki, Kaufman, Damasio, Damasio, Granner,
Bakken, Hori, Howard, & Adolphs, 2001). The other studies have shown that 
the processing of pleasant pictures was distinguished from neutral pictures by
activations in the left cingulate, left preuncus, right and left insula, right inferior 
frontal gyrus, visual cortex, and left caudate nucleus (cf. Paradiso et al., 1999;
Teasdale et al., 1999; Lane et al., 1997; Vartanian & Goel, 2004). The left parietal
cortex is active in the comparison beautiful vs neutral pictures (Kawabata &
Zeki, 2004).
Aesthetic experience and other emotions and feelings
Most of the previous psychological and fMRI studies were focused on
basic hedonic evaluation of aesthetic stimuli (pleasant-unpleasant), but as Silvia
(2007) has pointed out, the aesthetic appraisal of art involves a much wider 
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– aesthetic emotions (cf. Silvia, 2005), which suggests that they contain certain
‘aesthetic quality’. Unfortunately, he does not provide the explicit criteria which
help us to make a clear distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic emotions
(e.g. aesthetic anger vs non-aesthetic anger).
Frijda  (1989) specified t he aesthetic emotions more precisely. He
distinguished two kinds of aesthetic emotions: complementing and responding
emotions. Complementing emotions are generated  by the artwork content 
(e.g. suffering for the pain of depicted c haracter). On the other  hand,
responding emotions are generated by the structure of artwork as such (e.g. our 
fascination with a perfect artistic form or composition). According to Frijda,
the complementing emotions are similar to the emotions in real life, whereas
the responding emotions are the aesthetic emotions in their fundamental sense
(feeling of mental pleasure, delight, fascination, etc).
Kubovy’s concept of pleasures of the mind also can help us to understand  d
the specificity and complexity of affective aspect of aesthetic experience (Kubovy,
1999). He differentiates pleasures of the mind from pleasures of the body and 
basic emotions. Pleasures of the mind and consequently aesthetic experience,
are not simple emotions but collections of emotions distributed over time, and 
they have no distinctive and coherent behavioral expressions and physiological
responses typical for simple emotions and pleasures of the body. For example,
during the reading of a novel or the watching of a movie the excitement, fear,
anger, pleasure and other emotions will subsequently change in respect to the
changing of the segments of the story that we are reading or watching (see also
Chatman, 1978).
Purpose of the study
The purpose of the present study is to investigate some aspects of aesthetic
experience which remained unclear in the existing theories. As we have already
mentioned, in aesthetic experience a person is highly interested in and fascinated 
with an object and that state is followed by a strong aesthetic feeling. However,
it is not quite clear what the nature of this feeling is. Some authors held that it 
was a special kind of emotion characterized by sense of unity with aesthetic
object, feeling of self-transending, and so on (cf. Cupchik & Winston, 1996;
Frijda, 1989; Marković & Radonjić, 2008; Ognjenović, 1997), whereas the other 
authors defined aesthetic feelings as various emotions induced by the content of 
an artwork, such as pleasure, anger, confusion, disgust, pride, surprise, and so on
(cf. Silvia, 2005, 2007).
If the aesthetic feeling is defined as an extraordinary emotional state (i.e.
pleasure of the mind, cf. Kubovy, 1999), the question is how is it associated 
with other emotions. Some authors identified it with the pleasurable emotions
and feelings (cf. Leder, et al., 2004; Martindale & Moore, 1990; Winkielman
& Cacioppo, 2001), whereas other authors showed that aesthetic feeling could Slobodan Marković 53
be associated with negative (unpleasant) emotions (Furnham & Avison, 1997;
Rawlings, 2003; Rawlings, Barrantes i Vidal, & Furnham, 2000; Silvia, 2005,
2007; Tobacyck, Myers & Bailey, 1981; Zaleski, 1984; Zuckerman, Ulrich, &
McLaughlin, 1993).
The final o pen  question refers to the relationship  between aesthetic
experience and other complex emotions and feelings. Kubovy’s (1999) concept of 
the pleasures of the mind and Chatman’s (1978) concept of narratives suggested 
that the aesthetic feeling was derived from the collections of emotions distributed 
over time. The implication of these concepts is that different combinations of 
emotions could be induced by the pictorial contents.
This study is concerned with the three above-mentioned questions: (1)
is the aesthetic experience independent of other affective states, emotions, and 
feelings,  (2)  is the aesthetic experience  independent of the affective tone or 
associated with either pleasurable or aversive emotions, and (3) which structure
of single emotions is associated with aesthetic experience.
In order to investigate these questions a factor-analytic study was conducted.
The aim of this study was to specify the factorial structure of the judgments on
a set of descriptors of aesthetic experience and other emotional qualities. The
basic question was whether the descriptors of aesthetic experience would be
grouped in the common coherent factor or they would be distributed in two,
three or more factors together with other emotional descriptors. The correlational
analyses will show the nature of the relationship between aesthetic experience
and other emotions. In the following paragraphs the selection of stimuli (i.e.
paintings as objects of judgments) and the selection of descriptors (i.e. scales on
which the stimuli were judged) will be elaborated in more details.
Preliminary study 1: Selection of paintings
We decided to use the figural and semi-figural paintings as stimuli. These
categories of paintings can be defined as more or less realistic (and vice versa
stylized) pictorial representations of objects and scenes. For instance, Renaissance
paintings are highly realistic (or lowly stylized), whereas Cubist paintings are
lowly realistic (or highly stylized). We have chosen this category of aesthetic
objects because they were explicitly created to carry both types of information,
aesthetic and emotional. Namely, it is easer to judge the specific emotional
content of representational than of abstract paintings or other categories of visual
objects.
In a previous study (Marković & Radonjić, 2008) the base of 200 figural
and 200 semi-figural paintings was created. For the purpose of the present 
study we randomly extracted 100 paintings (50 from each category) and asked 
ten participants to select 20 paintings to cover the widest possible spectrum of 
different styles and motifs (themes). Participants finally selected twenty four 
paintings as a stimulus set for the main study. The titles of paintings were
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Preliminary study 2: Selection of descriptors
Two groups of descriptors were specified. The first group included nine
descriptors taken from the previous study of aesthetic experience: fascinating,
irresistible, unique, eternal, profound, exceptional, universal, unspeakable, and 
I would like to have this painting (Polovina & Marković, 2006). The second  g
group of descriptors was derived from Plutchik’s model of emotions (Plutchik,
1980). In his model Pluchik defined eight primary emotions organized into
bipolar  pairs: joy-sadness, trust-disgust, fear-anger and surprise-anticipation d ,
and eight secondary polar emotions: optimism-dissaproval, love-remorse,
submission-contempt and  t awe-aggressiveness. For the purpose of our study
we  have transformed t he names of emotions  into appropriate adjectives
with affective meanings, such as cheerful, sad, trustful,  disgusting, scared,
angry, surprising, anticipating, optimistic, disapproving, lovable, remorsing,
submissive, contempting, despising, awing and aggressive. However, we noticed 
that this list of affective descriptors is not completely adequate for expressing
the emotional content of paintings. For instance, a painting can not be scared,
but scary, or if a painting is judged as aggressive, the reaction of a subject can
be fear, not aggression, and so on. In order to avoid possible vagueness and 
misunderstandings, we made a study in which the participants were asked to
judge how the affective attributes (adjectives listed above) are good descriptors
of the emotional content of paintings. They were also told to add the descriptors
of emotions which are not on list, or to remove the inadequate descriptors.
Finally, 22 most frequent affective descriptors were specified: cheerful,
sad, appealing, disgusting, angry, scary, suprising, anticipating, delightful,
hateful, awing, erotic, proud, timid, trustful, dissappointed, tragic, humorous,
lovely, charming, jealous, pitiful.
In sum, a set of 31 descriptors was selected (9 descriptors of aesthetic
experience and 22 of emotions). All are given in the form of adjectives (except 
the statement I would like to have this painting) and this form was used for the
construction of a set of unipolar seven-point scales. There were three reasons
why the unipolar scales were used  instead of bipolar scales for emotions.
First, all scales, including the scales of aesthetic experience and emotions,
should be uniform, that is unipolar. Second, there was a difficulty in finding
the opposites for some emotions (e.g. jealous). The third, and most important 
reason for using unipolar scales is that they assume the independence of each
emotional quality, including the opposite ones. Namely, the unipolar scales are
sensitive to the situations where some opposite emotional qualities are equally
(positively) associated with the same pictorial narrative. For instance, different 
aspects and parts of the same pictorial contents could be judged as scary and 
angry, appealing and disgusting, and so on. For that reason, the bipolar scales
would not be appropriate because they assume the negative correlation between
opposite emotions, and consequently, they would not be sensitive for their 
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Method
Participants: Thirty one undergraduate students of the Department of Psychology, University
of Belgrade (18 female and 13 male) participated in the experiment.
Stimuli: Twenty four paintings (see the list of paintings in the paragraph Preliminary study 1).
Instrument: The list of thirty one unipolar seven-point scales was used as an instrument (nine
scales represent aesthetic and 22 affective descriptors). The descriptors of aesthetic experience
were fascinating, irresistible, unique, eternal, profound, exceptional, universal, unspeakable,
and I would like to have this painting. The descriptors of the emotional content of paintings
were cheerful, sad, appealing, disgusting, angry, scary, suprising, anticipating, delightful,
hateful, awing, erotic, proud, timid, trustful, disappointing, tragic, humorous, lovely, charming,
jealous, pitiful. The instrument with a randomized order of scales was shown in Appendix 1.
Procedure: Twenty four paintings were presented to two groups of participants  (N1=16,
N2=15) with a different randomized order for each group. The stimuli were presented by a
LCD projector on the screen. The stimuli were observed from a distance of 3–4 m and the
dimensions of their screen projections were 1,5 x 1,5 m. Participants were asked to judge the
stimuli on 31 seven-point scales by marking the grade, according to their impressions of the
extent of the particular attribute that was expressed. They were told that grade 1 indicates the
least, and 7 the gretaest intensity of attribute expression. The time for the judgment of each 7
painting was not limited. When all participants judged the painting on all 31 scales, the slide
with the next painting was presented.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The problem of this and many previous similar studies was how to
organize the data matrices for the factor analysis (see for instance Marković &
Radonjić, 2008). Namely, a factor analysis required a 2-D matrix, whereas we
were dealing with a 3-D data structure: Participants x Stimuli x Scales. In order 
to solve this problem we used the stringing out method proposed by Osgood and  t
his collaborators (see Osgood et al., 1975). According to this method, the 3-D
matrix was organized into a 2-D matrix by arranging the single stimuli matrices
one under the other. The main problem with stringing out was the reduction of  t
variance coming from the participants, because the same participants’ sample
was repeated. However, alternative methods of matrix reduction from 3-D to
2-D had even greater shortcomings. For instance, the compression of participants
using mean judgments values to obtain a 2-D matrix (Stimuli x Scales) required 
a very large number of stimuli (since the number or rows should be at least three
times the number of columns). This would be very demanding for participants
who would need to judge a large number of paintings. Another possibility would 
be to use a confirmatory factor analysis; however, the use of this technique
would not be economic since it would require a comparison of a great number 
of factorial structures. Choosing the stringing out method was not ideal, but 
it served as the best possible solution for the purpose of our study. Having in
mind that we were not interested in the individual differences, but in the general
factorial structures of the paintings judgments, we could allow the multiplication
of the relatively small sample of participants, but not the reduction of paintings
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So, the string out data matrix was generated: the matrices for 24 individual
paintings were arranged, one under the other. Results of the principal component 
analysis with the revealed seven factors with Eigen values above one are shown
in Table 1.
Table 1: Results of the principal component analysis: factors with the Eigen values and the
percents of explained variance.
Factors Eigen values Explained variance in %
1 8,42 27,18
2 5,63 18,15
3 1,83 5,91
4 1,67 5,38
5 1,44 4,63
6 1,20 3,88
7 1,02 3,31
Only the first two factors were semantically satisfying to be further 
interpreted. Having in mind their content (i.e. most loaded scales) we named 
them Affective Tone (Factor 1) and Aesthetic Experience (Factor 2). These two
factors together explained almost half of the entire variance (45,33 %). Other 
factors explained a small percents of variance, and their contents (most loaded 
descriptors) were not conceptually coherent. Two extracted factors with percents
of explained variance and loading indexes of related scales are shown in Table
2 (a similar internal structure of factors was obtained after the Varimax and 
Promax rotations).
Table 2: Two extracted factors with the percents of the explained variance and the loadings 
indexes of the most loaded scales.
Factor 1
AFFECTIVE TONE
27,18 
%
Factor 2
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
18,15 
%
Lovely .83 Exceptional .75
Charming .81 Profound .75
Cheerful .74U n i que .68
Appealing .73 Awing  .65
Irresistible .69 Delightful .58
I would like to have this painting .63 Fascinating .57
Scary -.74 Eternal .57
Disgusting -.72 Unspeakable .56
Hateful- . 70
Tragic -.69
Sad -.66
Pitiful- .65
Disappointing -.61
Angry -.53Slobodan Marković 57
Factor 1, Affective Tone, was bipolar  in nature. Descriptors such as
lovely,  charming, cheerful and  l appealing were on its positive pole, whereas g
scary, disgusting, hateful and  l tragic were on the negative pole. In other words,
the factor analysis grouped almost all affective descriptors in a single bipolar 
dimension regardless of their qualitative differences. For instance, scary,
tragic and disappointing were clearly different affective qualities, but all were g
associated together in the negative pole of the factor Affective Tone.
Factor 2, Aesthetic Experience, encompassed a lmost all  descriptors of 
aesthetic experience specified in the study by Polovina and Marković (2006).
Only two descriptors, irresistible and I would like to have this painting, have
“transferred”  into a positive  pole of Affective Tone. This transfer could  be
explained by the fact that two descriptors had a strong positive affective
meaning and express the attractiveness of paintings. On the other hand, the new
descriptor, awing, has emerged in the factor Aesthetic Experience. The reason
for this, perhaps, lies in the fact that awe was a complex emotion which includes
both positive and negative affective meanings (adoration and fear) expressing an
exceptional subject-object relationship.
In order to specify the extent in which the Affective Tone and Aesthetic
Experience were independent factors, two additional analyses were made:
correlation  between the factors obtained after the Promax rotation. Promax
rotation revealed low correlation between the factors Affective Tone and Aesthetic
Experience, r = .11, which means that these factors are highly independent.
The second measure of inter-factor correlation was Pearson’s coefficient.
For that purpose two variables were created. First variable was Affective Tone
which has been defined as an average value of the three most saturated positive
scales: lovely, charming and  g cheerful, and three most saturated negative scales:
scary, disgusting and  g hateful (the values of negative scales were transformed  l
from 1–7 to 7–1 because they were in a negative correlation with the factor).
The second variable was Aesthetic Experience which has been defined as the
average value of six most saturated scales: exceptional, profound,  d d unique, awing,
delightful and  l fascinating. The averaged judgments and the standard deviations
of Affective Tone and Aesthetic Experience for 24 paintings are shown in
Appendix 2. Pearson’s coefficient has shown no significant correlation between
Affective Tone and Aesthetic Experience, r = .14, indicating independence of 
these two variables.
CONCLUSION
This paper was concerned with the phenomenon of aesthetic experience and 
its relationship with other emotional qualities judged in paintings. Theoretically,
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person  is focused on a particular object, transcending  its everyday uses and 
meanings and losing the awareness of surroundings and even of himself/herself;
in this state a person can have an exceptional emotional experience, that is a
feeling of unity with the object (cf. Cupchik & Winston, 1996; Frijda, 1989;
Ognjenović, 1997). In a previous factor-analytic study aesthetic experience was
empirically specified as a set of descriptors such as exceptional, fascinating, and 
so on (Polovina & Marković, 2006). This set of descriptors reflects all relevant 
characteristics  listed  in various theoretical  definitions of aesthetic experience
(e.g. fascination with an object, an exceptional status of the object  in mind,
etc). One of the implications of the mentioned definitions was that the aesthetic
experience could be followed by a wide spectrum of other emotions including
both pleasant and unpleasant ones. Namely, both categories of objects, pleasant 
ones (e.g. cute, beautiful, erotic, etc.) and unpleasant ones (e.g. horrible, tragic,
obscure, etc.) could be equally fascinating and judged as exceptional.
In order to investigate the relationship between aesthetic experience and 
other emotions the principle component analysis of painting judgments on a set 
of aesthetic and affective descriptors was used. Two large factors, Affective Tone
and Aesthetic Experience, were obtained.
The results of factor analysis have shown three things. First, the aesthetic
experience is specified as a special kind of emotion which is independent of 
other emotions and feelings. As the results indicated, this aesthetic feeling is
characterized  by a person’s fascination and a feeling of an exceptional and  l
profound relationship with an object (painting). d
The second, factor analysis and additional analyses indicated a low and 
statistically nonsignificant correlation between the paintings judgments on two
factors. In other words, these findings suggested that aesthetic experience is not 
reducible to pleasure or affective attraction, but it can be associated equally with
both pleasant (attractive) and unpleasant (aversive) paintings.
Finally, the third f inding  is that all affective  descriptors were grouped 
into a single bipolar factor. Descriptors such as lovely, charming, cheerful and  l
appealing were on the  positive  pole of this factor, while  g scary,  disgusting,
hateful and  l tragic were on its negative pole. In other words, it seems that the
basic hedonic dimension of emotions (pleasure-aversion) overruled their specific
characteristics. For instance, similarity between cuteness and eroticism (positive
hedonic tone)  is stronger than their qualitative  differences  (e.g. protective
activity associated with cuteness and sexual behavior associated with eroticism).
The same thing is with emotions which have a negative hedonic tone: various
emotions such as sadness, disgust and fear are grouped together because they
are primarily experienced as unpleasant and associated with basically aversive
and avoidance behavior. One of the reasons why we didn’t specify more specific
affective factors could be the small number of descriptors, where each emotion
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designed to map “affective space” in better resolution and aimed to specify more
coherent affective factors (e.g. factors of sadness, fear, joy etc.) each emotional
quality should be represented with several descriptors (e.g. sadness with sad,
sorry, distressed, gloomy, hurting etc.).
The present study gave us a better insight into the relationship between
aesthetic experience and other affective qualities experienced in paintings.
However, it opened some new questions which should be the subject of further 
investigations. We will mention three of them. First, we specified only a general
relationship between aesthetic experience and the elementary affective tone
(hedonic values of paintings), while the more complex relationship between
aesthetic experience and specific emotions or collections of emotions remained 
unexplored and unclear. As a starting point for the study of this fine relationship
can be Kubovy’s (1999) idea that the pleasures of the mind, including the aesthetic
experience as well, are derived from the sequences of emotions distributed over 
time.
The second opened question refers to the generalizability of the results
obtained in one category of visual arts, that is representational (figural and semi-
figural) paintings. We believe that aesthetic experience is independent of the
hedonic value regardless of the kind of art (i.e. whether the object of experience
is a painting, sculpture, music, literature, dance, film, etc). Some studies support 
the idea that in different kinds of art lie some invariants (e.g. similar narrative
structures are identified in drama and music, cf. Maus, 1997), but systematic
researches still have to be done in order to obtain comprehensive and satisfying
empirical answer on this question.
Finally, the third question addresses the problem of the aesthetic stimulus
as well, but in a more general sense. Namely, we defined aesthetic experience
as a fascination with not only artistic, but any natural and man-made object.
Further studies have to specify two things referring to this issue. Firstly, they
have to specify the invariants which bound together diverse sorts of artistic and 
non-artistic aesthetic objects, scenes and events. Secondly, further studies have
to specify the crucial difference, if it exists at all, in the experience of artistic
and non-artistic aesthetic objects. For instance, some authors believe that the
specific knowledge of explicit and hidden narrative layers is necessary for the
understanding and the appraisal of artwork (cf. Gombrich, 1969; Silvia, 2005),
whereas in the case of non-artistic objects (e.g. natural scenes) the role of 
knowledge is very reduced and minimized.
Having in mind all constraints of the present study, we may conclude that it 
can be a useful frame for designing a wider program of investigation of aesthetic
experience. Some domains of this program were already delineated: (a) the
nature of aesthetic experience (an exceptional state of mind and its relationship
with other similar states), (b) the relationship between aesthetic experience and 
aesthetic preference (independence of pleasure and beauty), (c) the role of other AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND THE EMOTIONAL CONTENT OF PAINTINGS 60
emotions or collections of emotions  in generating aesthetic experience  (e.g.
underlying narrative structures), and  (d) t he objects of aesthetic fascination
and corresponding cognitive processes which transpose non-aesthetic things in
virtual aesthetic reality.
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Appendix 1
Instrument used in the study: 31 seven-point scales.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fascinating
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Lovely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trustful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Cheerful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Surprising
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Scary
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Eternal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Erotic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Universal
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Proud
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disgusting
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Anticipating
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Profound
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Charming
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Humorous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Irresistible
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Angry
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Delightful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sad
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unique
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Timid
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Hateful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Exceptional
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Awing
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Tragic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unspeakable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disappointing
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Jealous
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I would like to have this painting
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pitiful
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 AppealingAESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND THE EMOTIONAL CONTENT OF PAINTINGS 64
Appendix 2
The averaged judgments (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the Affective
Tone and Aesthetic Experience for 24 paintings. The measure of the Affective
Tone was obtained by averaging across three positive scales lovely, charming
and cheerful and three negative scales  l scary, disgusting and  g hateful (the values l
for these scales were recalculated from 1–7 to 7–1). The measure of Aesthetic
Experience was calculated as an average value of six scales: exceptional,
profound,  d d unique, awing, delightful and  l fascinating.
Paintings
Affective
tone
Aesthetic
experience
M SD M SD
1 – Henri Matisse: The joy of life 4.34 1.45 4.00 1.34
2 –
Jacques-Louis David: Consecration of the
Emperor Napoleon I and coronation of the
Empress Josephine (detail)
3.11 1.66 4.21 0.78
3 – Pablo Picasso: Celestina 1.39 0.34 3.66 1.89
4 – Georges de La Tour: The fortune teller 2.03 0.98 2.97 1.59
5 – Camille Pissarro: The garden at Pontoise 5.32 1.30 4.21 0.91
6 – Vincent Ko: Still life with eggs in wire
basket 2.48 1.15 2.39 0.77
7 – Peter Rubens: Bacchus 2.29 1.50 3.29 1.86
8 – Pablo Picasso: Three musicians 4.00 1.73 3.95 0.95
9 –  Artemisia Gentileschi: Judith beheading 
Holofernes 1.66 0.18 3.73 2.05
10 –  Egon Schiele: Scornful woman 1.66 1.05 3.16 1.69
11 – Pierre-Auguste Renoir: On the terrace 4.37 1.59 4.10 0.18
12 – Edgar Degas: In a cafe (The absinthe
drinker) 2.06 0.964 .03 1.21
13 – Paul Gauguin: Woman holding a fruit 3.79 1.963 .81 1.22
14 – Francisco Goya: The third of may 1808. 1.52 0.18 3.56 2.21
15 – Sir John Everett Millais: The bridesmaid 2.69 1.43 3.92 1.16
16 – Albrecht Durer: The man of sorrows 1.35 0.25 3.97 1.62
17 – Paul Klee: 1914. 3.85 1.38 3.32 0.70
18 – Edvard Munch: Jealous 2.05 0.963 . 73 1.56
19 – Lidia Dinner: Still life carnations 4.56 1.83 3.42 1.22
20 – Theodore Gericault: Severed heads 1.19 0.12 3.85 1.80
21 – Antoine-Jean Gros: Napoleon at Arcola 2.71 1.03 3.97 0.71
22 – Gustav Klimt: Danae 2.95 1.09 3.98 1.21
23 – Henri Rousseau: Two monkeys in the jungle 4.35 0.962 . 94 0.30
24 – Giorgio de Chirico: La commedia e la
tragedia 2.79 1.15 4.60 1.06